

















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3131 










An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 









This paper shows that non-linearities imposed by a neoclassical production function alone can 
generate time-varying and asymmetric risk premia over the business cycle. These (empirical) 
key features become relevant, and asset market implications improve substantially when we 
allow for non-normalities in the form of rare disasters. We employ analytical solutions of 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models, including a novel solution with endogenous 
labor supply, to obtain closed-form expressions for the risk premium in production 
economies. In contrast to endowment economies, the curvature of the policy functions affects 
the risk premium through controlling the individual’s effective risk aversion. 
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\... the challenge now is to understand the economic forces that determine the
stochastic discount factor, or put another way, the rewards that investors demand
for bearing particular risks." (Campbell, 2000, p.1516)
In general equilibrium models, the stochastic discount factor is not only determined by
the consumption-based rst-order condition, but also linked to business cycle characteristics.
In macroeconomics, dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGE) have been very
successful in explaining co-movements in aggregate data, but relatively less progress has
been made to reconcile their asset market implications with nancial data (cf. Grinols and
Turnovsky, 1993; Jermann, 1998, 2010; Tallarini, 2000; Lettau and Uhlig, 2000; Boldrin,
Christiano and Fisher, 2001; Lettau, 2003; Campanale, Castro and Clementi, 2010).1 One
main advantage of using general equilibrium models to explain asset market phenomena is
that the asset-pricing kernel is consistent with the macro dynamics, which oers excellent
guidance to the future development of models in both macroeconomics and nance.
However, surprisingly little is known about the risk premium in non-linear DSGE models.2
At least two primary questions present themselves. Which economic forces determine the
market risk premium in general equilibrium? What are the implications of using production
based models compared to the endowment economy? This paper lls the gap by studying
asset pricing implications of prototype DSGE models analytically.3 Why is this important?
We argue that a clear understanding of the risk premium can best be achieved by working
out analytical solutions. These solutions are shown to be important knife-edge cases which
can therefore be used to shed light on our numerical results.
In a nutshell, this paper shows that a neoclassical production function alone generates
key features of the risk premium. The economic intuition is that individual's eective risk
aversion, excluding singular cases, is not constant in a neoclassical production economy.
We use analytical solutions of DSGE models. For this purpose we readopt formulating
models in continuous-time (as in Merton, 1975; Eaton, 1981; Cox, Ingersoll and Ross, 1985)
which gives closed-form solutions for a broad class of models and parameter sets.4 Recent
research emphasizes the importance of non-linearities and non-normalities in explaining busi-
1There is an increasing interest in DSGE models in nance (cf. Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer, 2006). A
survey of the literature on the intersection between macro and nance is Cochrane (2008, chap. 7).
2Grinols and Turnovsky (1993) and Turnovsky and Bianconi (2005) study asset pricing implications of
aggregate risk and/or idiosyncratic shocks in stochastic endogenous growth models with a quasi-linear pro-
duction technology. Our formulation focuses on non-linear DSGE models with transitional dynamics.
3Our approach diers from the `analytical' approach of Campbell (1994), as we obtain exact solutions.
4Analytical solutions to continuous-time DSGE models can be found in Turnovsky (1993, 2000), Corsetti
(1997), W alde (2005), Turnovsky and Smith (2006), and Posch (2009).ness cycle dynamics for the US economy (Fern andez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ram rez, 2007;
Justiniano and Primiceri, 2008; Posch, 2009). To illustrate our general equilibrium pricing
approach, the starting point is Lucas' fruit-tree endowment economy with rare disasters.
We obtain closed-form expressions for the `implicit risk premium' from the Euler equation
and relate it to the `market risk premium'. Subsequently the framework is extended to a
neoclassical production economy and (non-tradable) human wealth with endogenous labor
supply. Our approach still gives closed-form expressions under parametric restrictions.
The major ndings can be summarized as follows. Non-linearities in DSGE models can
generate time-varying and asymmetric risk premia over the business cycle.5 Although these
key features of the risk premium are negligible in the standard real business cycle model, we
show that they become relevant, and asset market implications improve substantially, when
we allow for non-normalities in the form of rare disasters (Rietz, 1988; Barro, 2006, 2009).
Our result is based on the nding that the individual's eective risk aversion is not constant
for non-homogeneous consumption functions (cf. Carroll and Kimball, 1996).6
One caveat of discrete-time models is the lack of analytical solutions. To some extent,
the gap between the literature of asset pricing models in nance using endowment models
and typically non-linear production economies in dynamic macroeconomics is due to the
diculty of solving these models. In particular by focusing on the eects of uncertainty,
the traditional approach of linearization about the non-stochastic steady state does not
provide an adequate framework. Alternatively, the literature suggests the use of risk-sensitive
objectives (Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini, 1999; Tallarini, 2000) or log-linearization methods
(Campbell, 1994; Lettau, 2003). Similarly, numerical strategies employ perturbation and
higher-order approximation schemes (cf. Taylor and Uhlig, 1990; Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe,
2004; van Binsbergen, Fern andez-Villaverde, Koijen and Rubio-Ram rez, 2010). Although
these methods usually are locally highly accurate, the eects of large economic shocks, such
as rare disasters on approximation errors, are largely unexplored.
Our continuous-time formulation does not suer from such limitations. First, we exploit
closed-form solutions, which are available for reasonable parametric restrictions, to study the
determinants of the risk premium analytically. Second, we use powerful numerical methods to
examine the properties of the risk premium for a broader parameter range without relying on
local approximations (Posch and Trimborn, 2010). We obtain the optimal policy functions
and risk premia in the neoclassical production economy, while our closed-form solutions can
5While the time-varying feature is well documented empirically (Welch and Goyal, 2008), there is some
evidence that the risk premium increases more in bad times than it decreases in good times (Mele, 2008).
6Other contributions to Mehra and Presott's (1985) equity premium puzzle for endowment economies, e.g.
Epstein and Zin (1989); Abel (1990, 1999); Constantinides (1990); Campbell and Cochrane (1999); Veronesi
(2004); Bansal and Yaron (2004), are generating time-varying risk aversion through dierent channels.
2be used to gauge the accuracy of the numerical method for large economic shocks. Thus we
propose this formulation as a workable paradigm in the macro-nance literature.
Our paper is closely related to Lettau (2003), who derives asset pricing implications in
a real business cycle model using log-linear approximations. Using this approach gives the
endogenous variables (in logs) as a linear function of the state variables (in logs). What are
we missing by using log-linear approximations? As a result, the risk premium is a function of
the (constant) elasticities of consumption with respect to the state variables, comparable to
our knife-edge solutions. But in fact the risk premium exhibits time-varying and asymmetric
behavior due to changes in eective risk aversion. Thus, we overlook potentially important
properties of the risk premium implied by the neoclassical production economy. We show
that closed-form results can be obtained in production economies for parametric restrictions,
which in turn shed light on the risk premium in the general case.
Our nding relates to Jermann (2010), who studies the determinants of the risk premium
as implied by producers' rst-order conditions. The author identies the adjustment cost
curvature and the investment volatility as key determinants of the risk premium, similar to
our ingredients such as the policy function curvature and the consumption volatility.
There is a literature documenting that the Barro-Rietz rare disaster hypothesis generates
a sizable risk premium.7 The most fundamental critique, however, is on the calibration of rare
disasters. Although there is empirical evidence that economic disasters have been suciently
frequent and large enough to make the hypothesis viable (cf. Barro, 2006), we emphasize that
our results do not crucially depend on the rare disaster hypothesis. Two reasons make the
hypothesis an excellent candidate for making the implications of the neoclassical production
function visible (which for small risk premia would be negligible). First, it substantially
increases the level of the risk premium without loosing analytical tractability. Second, it does
not require other forms of non-linearities such as habit formation or recursive preferences
which allows us to obtain very sharp results. Thus we do not contribute to the debate of why
the historic equity premium seems too high given the low aggregate consumption volatility
and our priors about risk aversion. In contrast, we conrm that the ability to buer risk
makes it even more challenging to generate sizable risk premia in production economies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 solves in closed form a
continuous-time version of Lucas' fruit-tree model with exogenous, stochastic production
and obtains the risk premium. Section 3 studies the eects of non-linearities on the risk
premium in Merton's neoclassical growth model. Section 4 concludes.
7Gabaix (2008) and Wachter (2009) suggest variable intensity versions together with recursive preferences,
which not only generates a time-varying risk premium but also increases the level of the premium, as a viable
explanation for several macro-nance puzzles. A more critical view is in Julliard and Gosh (2008).
32 An endowment economy
This section illustrates our general equilibrium approach to compute the risk premium in
an endowment economy, i.e., the minimum dierence an individual requires in normal times
to accept an uncertain rate of return between the expected value and the (shadow) risk-free
rate the individual is indierent to. It also shows how rare disasters can account for the
equity premium puzzle which became known as the Barro-Rietz `rare disaster hypothesis'.
2.1 Lucas' fruit-tree model with rare disasters
Consider a fruit-tree economy (one risky asset or equity), and a riskless asset in normal times
with default risk (government bond) similar to Barro (2006).
2.1.1 Description of the economy
Technology. Consider an endowment economy (Lucas, 1978). Suppose production is entirely
exogenous: no resources are utilized, and there is no possibility of aecting the output of
any unit at any time, Yt = At where At is the stochastic technology. Output is perishable.
The law motion of At will be taken to follow a Markov process,
dAt =  Atdt +  AtdBt + (e
    1)At dNt; (1)
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion, Nt is a standard Poisson process at arrival rate ,
whereas   and   determine the conditional instantaneous mean and variance of percentage
changes in output. The jump size is assumed to be a constant fraction of output, e    1, an
instant before the jump, At , ensuring that At does not jump negative.
In this economy the bonds with default risk are issued exogenously by the government.
Suppose that the price of the government bill follows
dp0(t) = p0(t)rdt + p0(t )DtdNt; (2)
where Dt is a random variable denoting a random default risk in case of a disaster, and q is
the probability of default (cf. Barro, 2006). For illustration, we assume
Dt =

0 with 1   q
e   1 with q :
Ownership of fruit-trees is determined at each instant in a competitive stock market, and
the production unit has one outstanding perfectly divisible equity share. A share entitles its
owner to all of the unit's instantaneous output in t. Shares are traded at a competitively
determined price, pt. Suppose that for the risky asset,
dpt = ptdt + ptdBt + pt JtdNt; (3)
4where Jt is a random variable denoting the jump risk.
Because prices fully reect all available information, the parameters r;; and Jt will be
determined in general equilibrium. The objective is to relate exogenous productivity changes
to the market determined movements in asset prices. In fact, the evolution of prices ensures
that assets are priced such that individuals are indierent between holding more assets and
consuming. Given initial wealth, we are looking for the optimal consumption path.
Preferences. Consider an economy with a single consumer, interpreted as a representative
\stand in" for a large number of identical consumers. The consumer maximizes discounted






0 > 0; u
00 < 0:
Assuming no dividend payments, the budget constraint reads
dWt = ((   r)wtWt + rWt   Ct)dt + wtWtdBt + ((Jt   Dt)wt  + Dt)Wt dNt; (4)
where Wt is real nancial wealth, and wt denotes a consumer's share holdings.
Equilibrium properties. In this economy, it is easy to determine equilibrium quantities of
consumption and asset holdings. The economy is closed and all output will be consumed,
Ct = Yt, and all shares will be held by capital owners.
2.1.2 The short-cut approach
In a companion paper we solve the more comprehensive approach considering both portfolio
selection and consumption. It is straightforward to show that the portfolio selection problem
can be separated from the consumption problem - a result we use throughout the paper.
Suppose that the only asset is the market portfolio,
dpM(t) = MpM(t)dt + MpM(t)dBt   M(t )pM(t )dNt; (5)
where M(t) is considered as an exogenous stochastic jump-size. With probability q it takes
the value M, and with probability 1   q the jump size is 
0
M. Thus, the consumer obtains
capital income and has to nance his or her consumption stream from wealth,
dWt = (MWt   Ct)dt + MWtdBt   M(t )Wt dNt: (6)
One can think of the original problem with budget constraint (4) as having been reduced
to a simple Ramsey problem in which we seek an optimal consumption rule given that income
is generated by the uncertain yield of a (composite) asset (cf. Merton, 1973).
5Dene the value function as







 tu(Ct)dt; s:t: (6); W0 > 0: (7)
Choosing the control Cs 2 R+ at time s, the Bellman equation reads
V (Ws) = max
Cs







+(V ((1   M)Ws)q + V ((1   
0
M)Ws)(1   q)   V (Ws))
	
: (8)
Because it is a necessary condition, the rst-order conditions reads
u
0(Cs)   VW(Ws) = 0 ) VW(Ws) = u
0(Cs) (9)
for any interior solution at any time s = t 2 [0;1).




















0(C((1   M(t ))Wt ))   u
0(C(Wt )))dNt; (10)
which implicitly determines the optimal consumption path, where we dene the market price
of diusion risk as   MWtu00(Ct)CW=u0(Ct). Moreover, we dene CW as the marginal
propensity to consume out of wealth, i.e., the slope of the consumption function. Using the
inverse function, we are able to determine the path for consumption (u00 6= 0).
To shed light on the eects of uncertainty we follow an approach similar to Steger (2005),






























In equilibrium, the certainty equivalent rate of return, i.e., the expected rate of return on














equals expected cost of forgone consumption, i.e., the subjective rate of time preference, and
the expected rate of change of marginal utility on the left-hand side in (11). It denotes the
percentage spread between the certainty equivalent rate of return (shadow risk-free rate)
6and the average rate of return of risky asset in normal times. For samples which include
suciently many disasters such that the observed frequency is equal to the true probability,
the (unconditional) expected rate of return on the market portfolio is M   E(M(t)).
The implicit risk premium as from (12) extends the `proportional probability premium'
in static utility-of-wealth models (Pratt, 1964) to dynamic consumption-portfolio models. It








Hence, the indirect utility function, i.e., the value function, and the utility function are
intimately linked by the optimality condition (9). This condition demands that the marginal
utility of consumption equals the marginal utility of wealth (cf. Breeden, 1979, p.274).
2.1.3 General equilibrium prices
This section shows that general equilibrium conditions pin down the prices in the economy.
From the Euler equation (10), we obtain
dCt =
 




















+MWtCWdBt + (C((1   M(t))Wt )   C(Wt ))dNt; (14)










Economically, concave utility (u0(c) > 0, u00(c) < 0) implies risk aversion, whereas convex
marginal utility, u000(c) > 0, implies a positive precautionary saving motive. Accordingly,
 u00(c)=u0(c) measures absolute risk aversion, whereas  u000(c)=u00(c) measures the degree of
absolute prudence, i.e., the intensity of the precautionary saving motive (Kimball, 1990b).
Because output is perishable, using the market clearing condition Yt = Ct = At,
dCt =  Ctdt +  CtdBt + (e
    1)Ct dNt: (15)
Thus, the general equilibrium approach pins down asset prices as follows. Dening optimal
jump in consumption as ~ C(Wt)  C((1   M(t))Wt)=C(Wt), market clearing requires the
percentage jump in aggregate consumption to match the disaster size, e    1 = ~ C(Wt)   1,
which implies a constant jump term. For example, if consumption is linearly homogeneous
in wealth (as shown for CRRA preferences below), the jump of the asset price satises8
C((1   M(t))Wt )=C(Wt ) = 1   M(t) ) M = 
0
M = 1   e
 : (16)
8Conditioning on no default, (M(t)jDt = 0) = 
0
M, gives e   1 =  
0
M, whereas conditioning on default,
(M(t)jDt = e   1) = M, demands e    1 =  M.
7Similarly, the market clearing condition pins down MWtCW =  Ct, and thus










    1);
where
r =   
u00(Ct)Ct
u0(Ct)











As a result, the higher the subjective rate of time preference, , the higher is the general
equilibrium interest rate to induce individuals to defer consumption (cf. Breeden, 1986). For
convex marginal utility (decreasing absolute risk aversion), u000(c) > 0, a lower conditional
variance of dividend growth,  2, a higher conditional mean of dividend growth,  , and a
higher default probability, q, decrease the bond price and increase the interest rate.
2.1.4 Components of the risk premium
















whereas the conditional market premium reads





































Note that one would expect   < 0 and  < 0 for a `disaster' hypothesis.
In the presence of default risk, the conditional market premium diers from the implicit
risk premium. The reason is that we obtain the implicit risk premium from the certainty
equivalent rate of return (shadow risk-free rate), but the government bill has a risk of default.
This default risk is not rewarded in the market as there is no truly riskless asset, but it is
reected in the implicit risk premium. If there was no default risk, the implicit risk premium
would have the usual interpretation of the conditional market premium.
2.1.5 Explicit solutions
As shown in Merton (1971), the standard dynamic consumption and portfolio selection
problem has explicit solutions where consumption is a linear function of wealth. For later
reference, we provide the solution for constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
8Proposition 2.1 (CRRA preferences) If utility exhibits constant relative risk aversion,
i.e.,  u00(Ct)Ct=u0(Ct) = , optimal consumption is linear in wealth, Ct = C(Wt) = bWt,
where the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth is
b 
 
 +    (1   )M   (1   M)






The eective relative risk aversion of the indirect utility in (13) is constant, RRAW = .
Proof. see Appendix A.1.3
Corollary 2.2 Use the optimal policy function, Ct = C(Wt) = bWt, and the conditional
market premium in general equilibrium (19) to obtain
M   r = 
2
M + e
  M   e
   (1   e
)q; (20)
with the conditional variance of the market portfolio M =  , the jump size of the market
portfolio M = 1   e , and the riskless rate in (17) as
r =  +     1
2(1 + ) 
2 +    (1   (1   e
)q)e
  :
The unconditional market premium, i.e., for long samples, is M   M   (r   (1   e)q).
Corollary 2.3 Use the optimal policy function, Ct = C(Wt) = bWt, and the implicit risk
premium in general equilibrium (18), to obtain
RP =  
2 + e
  (1   e
 ) = M   r + e
  (1   e
)q: (21)
Similar to Barro (2006), the traditional risk premium in (21) increases by e  (1   e ),
which can be sizable. Thus, the intuition why rare disaster may solve the equity premium
puzzle is straightforward. Even for logarithmic utility,  = 1, and for low-probability events,
 = 0:01, the premium for the jump risk in percentage points, e     1, can be very large.
For the case of `disasters' one would expect   to be negative. The more negative is the
parameter, the more severe is the disaster and   !  1 denotes complete destruction.
As we show below, the reason that the risk premium is constant is that the consumption
function is homogeneous (of degree k = 1), which implies that eective risk aversion is
constant. A time-varying disaster size and/or arrival rate (i.e., stochastic volatility) can
even lead to a level increase of the risk premium (cf. Gabaix, 2008; Wachter, 2009).
92.1.6 Stochastic discount factor
This section illustrates the link between the implicit risk premium and the stochastic discount
factor (SDF). Similar to the implicit risk premium, the SDF follows from the Euler equation
(10), which in general equilibrium is
du
0(Ct) = (   r)u
0(Ct)dt + (1   e
)u
0(C(e
 Wt))qdt   (u
0(C(e





 Wt ))   u
0(C(Wt )))dNt;
where the deterministic term consists of, rstly, the dierence between the subjective rate
of time preference and the riskless rate, secondly, a term which transforms this rate into the
certainty equivalent rate of return (shadow risk-free rate) and, thirdly, the compensation
































































denes the stochastic discount factor (also known as the pricing kernel or state-price density)
















 ( +     1
2 
2)(s   t) +  (Bs   Bt)    (Ns   Nt)

which has the standard properties (cf. Campbell, 2000). This result illustrates that the Euler
equation (10) can be used to compute both the implicit risk premium and the SDF in any
continuous-time DSGE model without explicitly studying asset pricing implications.
3 A neoclassical production economy
This section illustrates that non-linearities in a neoclassical DSGE model imply interesting
asset market implications, in particular these can generate a time-varying risk premium. We
use a version of Merton's (1975) asymptotic theory of growth under uncertainty.
103.1 A model of growth under uncertainty
This section assumes that there is no truly riskless asset. We employ the certainty equivalent
rate of return - or the shadow risk-free rate - to obtain the implicit risk premium.
3.1.1 Description of the economy
Technology. At any time, the economy has some amounts of capital, labor, and knowledge,
and these are combined to produce output. The production function is a constant return to
scale technology Yt = AtF(Kt;L); where Kt is the aggregate capital stock, L is the constant
population size, and At is the stock of knowledge or total factor productivity (TFP), which
in turn is driven by a standard Brownian motion Bt,
dAt =  Atdt +  AtdBt: (23)
At has a log-normal distribution with E0(lnAt) = lnA0 +(   1
2 2)t, and V ar0(lnAt) =  2t.
The capital stock increases if gross investment exceeds stochastic capital depreciation,
dKt = (It   Kt)dt + KtdZt + (e
   1)Kt dNt; (24)
where Zt is a standard Brownian motion (uncorrelated with Bt), and Nt is a standard Poisson
process with arrival rate . Unlike in Merton's (1975) model, the assumption of stochastic
depreciation introduces instantaneous riskiness making physical capital indeed a risky asset
(for similar examples see Turnovsky, 2000). The fundamental dierence to Lucas' endowment
economy is that the outstanding equity shares follow a stochastic process as well, i.e., not
only the production technology but also the number of trees is stochastic.
Preferences. Consider an economy with a single consumer interpreted as a representative







0 > 0; u
00 < 0 (25)
subject to
dWt = ((rt   )Wt + w
L
t   Ct)dt + WtdZt + (e
   1)Wt dNt: (26)
Wt  Kt=L denotes individual wealth, rt is the rental rate of capital, and wL
t is labor income.
The paths of factor rewards are taken as given by the representative consumer.
Equilibrium properties. In equilibrium, factors of production are rewarded with value
marginal products, rt = YK and wL
t = YL. The goods market clearing condition demands
Yt = Ct + It: (27)
11Solving the model requires the aggregate accumulation constraints (23) and (24), the
goods market equilibrium (27), equilibrium factor rewards of competitive rms, and the
rst-order condition for consumption. It gives a system of stochastic dierential equations
which, given initial conditions, determines the paths of Kt, Yt, rt, wL
t and Ct, respectively.
3.1.2 The short-cut approach
Dene the value of the optimal program as







 tu(Ct)dt s:t: (26) and (23); W0;A0 > 0; (28)
which denotes the present value of expected utility along the optimal program. Similar to
the endowment economy, we obtain the rst-order condition for the problem as
u
0(Ct) = VW(Wt;At) (29)
for any t 2 [0;1), making consumption a function of the state variables Ct = C(Wt;At).
It can be shown that the Euler equation is (cf. appendix)
du













which implicitly determines the optimal consumption path. To shed some light on the eects






















In equilibrium, the certainty equivalent rate of return, i.e., the expected return on the risky










equals the cost of forgone consumption. It is remarkable that the structure is equivalent
to the endowment economy (18), but the premium in (31) has quite interesting properties.
The most obvious result is that the implicit risk premium indeed refers to the rewards that
investors demand for bearing the systematic risk, while it does not directly account for the
risk of a stochastically changing total factor productivity (23).
123.1.3 Explicit solutions
A convenient way to describe the behavior of the economy is in terms of the evolution of
Ct, At and Wt. Similar to the endowment economy we obtain explicit solutions. Due to the
non-linearities they are available only for specic parametric restrictions. Below we use two
known restrictions where the policy function Ct = C(At;Wt) (or consumption function) is
available, and all economic variables can be solved in closed form.
Proposition 3.1 (linear-policy-function) If the production function is Cobb-Douglas,
Yt = AtK
t L1 , utility exhibits constant relative risk aversion, i.e.,  u00(Ct)Ct=u0(Ct) = ,
and  = , then optimal consumption is linear in wealth.
 =  ) Ct = C(Wt) = Wt
where   (   (e(1 )   1) + (1   ))= + 1
2(1   )2 (32)
Proof. see Appendix A.2.2





Proposition 3.3 (constant-saving-function) If the production function is Cobb-Douglas,
Yt = AtK
t L1 , utility exhibits constant relative risk aversion, i.e.,  u00(Ct)Ct=u0(Ct) = ,
and the subjective rate of time preference is
   (e
(1 )   1)     + 1
2
 
(1 + ) 
2   (1   )
2
  (1   ); (34)
then optimal consumption is proportional to current income (non-linear in wealth).
 =   ) Ct = C(Wt;At) = (1   s)AtW

t ;  > 1; where s  1= (35)
Proof. see Appendix A.3.2






We are now in a position to understand why the (implicit) risk premium depends on the
curvature of the policy function (or consumption function): Any homogenous consumption
function, where CW(Wt;At)Wt = kC(Wt;At) or equivalently C(cWt;At) = ckC(Wt;At) for
c;k 2 R+, implies a constant risk premium. Technically, the policy function is homogenous
of degree k in wealth. Because these functions are obtained only for knife-edge restrictions,
13we conclude that the (implicit) risk premium generally will be dependent on wealth which
in turn implies a time-varying behavior since wealth is changing stochastically.
Economically, the reason why the risk premium depends on the curvature of the policy
function (and can vary over time) is that the optimal response to disasters or shocks depends
on the level of wealth. An individual with high levels of nancial wealth will adjust his or her
optimal expenditures for consumption dierently from an individual that has no nancial
wealth. Though the utility function has CRRA with respect to consumption, the indirect
utility function (the value function) does not exhibit CRRA with respect to wealth except
for the knife-edge cases above. This nding is closely related to the link Kimball (1990a)
shows between the marginal propensity to consume and the eective risk aversion of the
value function. Accordingly, a higher marginal propensity to consume out of gross wealth
(inclusive of labor income) raises the eective risk aversion. A concave consumption function
implies that eective risk aversion falls more quickly with wealth than it does for the case of
a constant marginal propensity to consume (Carroll and Kimball, 1996, p.982).
There are two important dierences to the earlier work. First, our consumption function
is dened by the optimal policy rule which gives consumption as a function of nancial
wealth (exclusive of labor income), i.e., the only observable and tradable asset. Hence, it
cannot easily be interpreted as a function of gross wealth (inclusive of labor income) or
total wealth (i.e., nancial and human wealth). Thus, the marginal propensity to consume
out of wealth is dened by the slope of the consumption function with respect to nancial
wealth. In contrast, the consumption and saving rates - in the tradition of the Solow model -
refer to current income (i.e., labor and capital income). Second, the eects of uncertainty are
studied in a general equilibrium environment which allows us to obtain analytical solutions for
linear and strictly concave consumption functions in a DSGE model for certain parametric
restrictions, while Carroll and Kimball restrict their focus on partial equilibrium models
leaving the processes for labor income and capital returns exogenous.
Our nding sheds light on how total factor productivity (TFP) generally aects the risk
premium in (31) though the consumer is not interested in hedging TFP risk directly. For any
consumption function non-homogeneous in wealth, eective relative risk aversion depends
on TFP through the consumption function, e.g., for CRRA preferences,
RPt = 




Unfortunately, an analytical study of the structural parameters in the general case is
not possible. Though clearly being knife-edge cases, our explicit solutions are important to
understand the mechanisms that aect the risk premium in DSGE models. Both solutions
14imply that the consumption function is homogenous and thus a constant risk premium.9
Below we study the implications when allowing the parameters to take dierent values.
3.1.4 Numerical solutions
This section implements the algorithm as in Posch and Trimborn (2010) to obtain a numer-
ical solution for the case where  =   =   = 0, and with A = 1. As it is seen below, this
assumption does not aect our conclusions, but reduces the computational burden as the
reduced form representing the dynamics of the DSGE model can be summarized as
dWt = ((rt   )Wt + w
L











where rt = YK and wL
t = YL. For the case of Cobb-Douglas production, Yt = AK
t L1 , and
CRRA preferences with relative risk aversion , we obtain from (31) or (37)
RPt 
C(eWt) 
C(Wt)  (1   e
): (38)
The numerical solution to the non-linear system of stochastic dierential equations is the
policy function, Ct = C(Wt), which is obtained from the optimal paths of control and state
variables computed for the complete state space Wt 2 R+. In particular our procedure does
not rely on local approximation methods, but directly solves the system using the Waveform
relaxation algorithm (cf. Posch and Trimborn, 2010). According to (38), we obtain the risk
premium by evaluating the optimal policy function at two points in the state space.
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal policy function and the resulting implicit risk premium
(38) for dierent values for the parameter of relative risk aversion. For  =  the policy
function is a linear-homogenous function with slope  which corresponds to the analytical
solution in (32). In this singular case the risk premium is e (1   e) (equivalent to
the risk premium in the endowment economy). At each point, the change of the expected
proportional decline in marginal utility equals the change in capital rewards, implying a
constant risk premium in (38). For  <  the policy function is convex, and the marginal
propensity to consume increases with wealth, C(eWt) < eC(Wt). This increase, however,
is less rapid than the increase of the consumption-wealth ratio which lowers the eective level
of risk aversion. Hence, the risk premium is convex and has the upper bound e (1   e)
for wealth approaching zero. For  > , which is the empirically most plausible scenario,
9For  = , the consumption function becomes a linear function in wealth, i.e., it is linearly homogeneous
or homogeneous of degree one. In the case of  =  , which is only possible for values  > 1, the consumption
function becomes homogeneous of degree .
15Figure 1: Risk premia in a production economy



























Notes: These gures illustrate the optimal policy functions (left panel) and the risk premium (right panel) as functions of
nancial wealth for dierent levels of relative risk aversion for the case of  =   =   = 0. The calibrations of other parameters
is (;;;;;1 e) = (:05;:75;;:1;:017;:4) where  = :5 (dotdash),  = :75 (dotted),  = 1 (longdash),  = 1:9406 (twodash)
which refers to the knife-edge case  =   in (35) with a constant saving rate,  = 4 (dashed), and  = 6 (solid).
the consumption function has the standard form, i.e., strictly concave and the marginal
propensity to consume is decreasing with wealth, C(eWt) > eC(Wt). In this case, the
properties of the risk premium (38) depend on whether the subjective rate of time preference
 exceeds or falls short of the knife-edge value   in (34).
At the knife-edge value of  =   the policy function is homogeneous of degree  which
refers to the analytical solution in (35) where the savings rate is constant, s = 1=, and
the risk premium is e (1   e). For  <   the individual prefers a higher savings rate,
s(Wt) > s, and the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth decreases more rapidly
than it would if the saving rate (or consumption-income ratio) were constant which lowers
the eective risk aversion. Because the saving rate is increasing in wealth and bounded by
unity, s < s(Wt) < 1, the risk premium is convex and has the upper bound e (1   e)
for wealth approaching zero. For  >   the saving rate is smaller, s(Wt) < s, and the
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth decreases less rapidly than it would if the
saving rate were constant which raises the eective risk aversion. Since the saving rate is
decreasing in wealth, the risk premium in (38) is concave with lower bound e (1 e) for
suciently risk averse individuals,   1. Otherwise the substitution eect dominates the
16precautionary savings eect which depresses savings and increases the marginal propensity
to consume (Weil, 1990). Since the consumption function is concave for  >  due to the
non-linear production function, eective risk aversion remains higher than for  = , such
that the lower bound is e max(;1)(1   e) for wealth approaching zero.
In our numerical study   depends on the arrival rate, , the disaster size, e   1, the
output elasticity of capital, , and the risk aversion, , which coincides with the inverse of
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES), and the rate of depreciation, . For the
case  > 1, that is when the output elasticity of capital exceeds the IES, this critical value
is positive,   > 0, and vice versa. Thus, for the empirically most plausible calibrations, e.g.,
for   0:5 and   4, we have  > 1 and obtain a positive knife-edge value,   > 0.
Our numerical study of the risk premium thus gives the following results. Considering
the empirically most plausible scenarios, we nd that the risk premium is time-varying
and asymmetric (concave) over the `business cycle'. In prosperous states of the economy
with higher transitional growth rates (capital scarcity), the risk premium is higher than in
periods with lower - or even negative - growth rates (capital abundance). In other words,
immediately after a disaster has occurred, the risk premium would jump to a higher level
and then subsequently return to lower values as more capital is accumulated.
Allowing for (Gaussian) stochastic depreciation,  > 0, and/or a second state variable
in the form of time-varying TFP,   6= 0,   > 0, the implicit risk premium is (37), and
the same analysis could be conducted. The consumption function is concave in wealth for
   and the risk premium has the same properties as in Figure 1, conditioned on the
state At. However, there are three main dierences. First, since the individual is willing to
hedge against the diusion risk (stochastic investment opportunities), the risk premium will
be slightly higher.10 Second, the risk premium in general also depends indirectly on TFP
trough the optimal consumption function, as described above. Finally, the knife-edge value
  as from (35) decreases in the mean,  , but increases in the variance  2 of TFP growth.
For the case  > 1 it increases in the variance of stochastic depreciation, 2.
3.1.5 Human wealth and nancial wealth
Economically, the individual implicitly solves an intertemporal consumption problem in a
stochastically changing investment opportunity set. In this view, the state variables which
determine investment opportunities are the aggregate capital stock, Kt, and total factor
productivity At, whereas the asset returns rt = r(At;Kt) and the wage rate wt = w(At;Kt)
depend on the state variables. The DSGE model at hand is a specic case where general
equilibrium conditions pin down asset prices as well as cost of capital and leisure (hours) in
10Since the diusion risk is of less importance, this eect is negligible (cf. Tables A.1.3 and A.1.3).
17the economy (cf. Campbell and Viceira, 2002, chap. 6).
In particular, the optimal decisions of households can be thought of in terms of nancial
wealth (physical assets) and human wealth, i.e., the present value of future labor income
(Bodie, Merton and Samuelson, 1992, p.431).11 It thus seems important to allow for exible
labor supply when studying the risk premium. Labor exibility introduces an additional
margin along which an individual can buer risk (Turnovsky and Bianconi, 2005, p.325).
3.2 An extension: endogenous labor supply
This section allows for elastic labor supply in the neoclassical DSGE model. Our objective
is to study how the time-varying property of the risk premium is aected by the ability of
individuals to buer risk through their labor-leisure choice. For reading convenience, this
section replicates some of the equations from the previous section.
3.2.1 Description of the economy
Technology. The production function exhibits constant return to scale, Yt = AtF(Kt;Ht);
where Kt is the aggregate capital stock, Ht is total hours worked and At is total factor
productivity, which in turn is driven by a standard Brownian motion Bt
dAt =  Atdt +  AtdBt: (39)
The capital stock increases if gross investment exceeds stochastic capital depreciation,
dKt = (It   Kt)dt + KtdZt + (e
   1)Kt dNt; (40)
where Zt is a standard Brownian motion (uncorrelated with Bt), and Nt is a standard Poisson
process with arrival rate , describing a counting process for the number of disasters.
Preferences. Consider an economy with a single consumer, interpreted as a representative
\stand in" for a large number of identical consumers, such that Ct = Lct = ct, where L is
normalized to one, and Ht = 1   lt with lt denoting the amount of leisure the individual





 tu(Ct;Ht)dt; uC > 0; uH < 0; uCC  0; uCCuHH   (uCH)
2  0; (41)
subject to
dWt = ((rt   )Wt + Htw
H
t   Ct)dt + WtdZt + JtWt dNt: (42)
11Bodie et al. (1992) show that the individual's human capital, which essentially is the same as a nancial
asset except that it is not traded, is valued by the individual as if it were a traded asset.
18Wt  Kt=L denotes individual wealth, rt is the rental rate of capital, and HtwH
t is labor
income. The paths of factor rewards are taken as given by the representative consumer.
Equilibrium properties. In equilibrium, factors of production are rewarded with value
marginal products, rt = YK and wH
t = YH. The goods market clearing condition demands
Yt = Ct + It: (43)
Solving the model requires the aggregate accumulation constraints (39) and (40), the
goods market equilibrium (43), equilibrium factor rewards of competitive rms, and the
rst-order condition for consumption and hours. It gives a system of equations which, given
initial conditions, determines the paths of Kt, Yt, rt, wH
t , Ct and Ht, respectively.
3.2.2 The short-cut approach
Dene the value function as







 tu(Ct;Ht)dt s:t: (42) and (39); W0;A0 > 0; (44)
denoting the present value of expected utility along the optimal program. It can be shown
that the rst-order conditions for any interior solution are (cf. appendix)




for any t 2 [0;1), making optimal consumption and hours functions of the state variables
Ct = C(Wt;At) and Ht = H(Wt;At), respectively. Specically it pins down the opportunity







It can be shown that the Euler equation for consumption is (cf. appendix)
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which implicitly determines the optimal consumption path. To shed some light on the eects



































Observe that the structure is equivalent to (31), with the notable dierence that the curvature
of both the policy function for consumption and hours matters for eective risk aversion,
and thus the risk premium (for consumption and leisure not being separable).
Technically, to examine whether the time-varying property survives in this economy for
utility exhibiting constant relative risk aversion, it is sucient to examine whether consumers
have the labor-leisure choice such that uCCCW + uCHHW = uCCCt which again would yield
the constant eective risk aversion similar to the endowment economy.
3.2.3 Explicit solutions
As before, a convenient way to describe the behavior of the economy is in terms of the
evolution of Ct, Ht, At and Wt. Similar to the endowment economy there exist explicit
solutions, however, due to the non-linearities these are only available for specic parameter
restrictions. Below we use one restriction where the policy functions Ct = C(At;Wt) and
Ht = H(At;Wt), and most economic variables of interest can be solved in closed form.
In what follows, we restrict our attention to the class of utility functions which exhibits
constant relative risk aversion with respect to both consumption and leisure,
u(Ct;Ht) =
(Ct(1   Ht) )1 
1   
;  > 0;    0: (50)
Similar to Turnovsky and Smith (2006), the parameter   measures the preference for leisure.
To ensure concavity, we restrict   (1 )   0. For the case where   = 0, the solutions in
Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 3.5 apply accordingly. For the broader case where   > 0,
a closed-form solution is obtained below. Both the following solution and the numerical
solution techniques used for the general case are novel in the macro literature.




t , utility exhibits constant relative risk aversion with respect to both leisure
and consumption, i.e., uHHHt=uH = 1 (1 )  and  uCCCt=uC = , respectively, and the
subjective rate of time preference is
   (e
(1 )   1)   (1   )     + 1
2
 
(1 + ) 
2   (1   )
2
;
then optimal consumption is proportional to income, and optimal hours are constant.





(1   )    (1   )
 > 1;   6= 0;
where s  1=
20Proof. see Appendix A.3.2
Corollary 3.6 Using the policy function Ct = C(Wt;At) = (1   s)AtW 





This particular rate of time preference,  , clearly is a knife-edge condition which ensures
that the optimal leisure, the saving rate and the implicit risk premium are constant. In this
singular case, the parameter measuring the preference for leisure,  , does not aect the risk
premium or the saving rate, though it aects hours. To study the dynamic eects of labor
supply exibility for a broader parameter set, we employ numerical solutions.
3.2.4 Numerical solutions
This section again uses the algorithm as in Posch and Trimborn (2010) to obtain a numerical
solution for the case  =   =   = 0 and A = 1. In particular, the reduced-form dynamics
then can be summarized by the budget constraint (42) and two Euler equations for both
consumption and hours. Moreover, the condition (47) implies that optimal consumption can
be expressed as a function of hours and wealth which again reduces the dimensionality.




A = 1 and preferences as in (50). Optimal behavior as from (47) demands












This pins down the optimal jump terms as
~ C(Wt) =





where ~ C(Wt)  C(eWt)=C(Wt); and ~ H(Wt)  H(eWt)=H(Wt), such that e.g. 1   ~ C(Wt)
denotes the percentage drop of optimal consumption after a disaster. As a result, we can
neglect the Euler equation for consumption since technically (52) and (53) give optimal
consumption as functions of optimal hours and nancial wealth, C(Wt) = C(H(Wt);Wt)
and ~ C(Wt) = ~ C(H(Wt)).12 Economically, optimal behavior of consumption is described
completely by optimal hours and nancial wealth through the algebraic condition (47).
As shown in the appendix, for 0 < Ht < 1 the reduced form can thus be summarized as
dHt =
   (1   )rt + (1   ) +    Ct=Wt
H
 1
t   (        )(1   Ht) 1 dt
 
~ C(Wt) +(1 )  ~ H(Wt)(1 ) e (1 ) 
H
 1
t   (        )(1   Ht) 1 dt + (H(e
Wt )   H(Wt ))dNt;
dWt = ((rt   )Wt + Htw
H
t   Ct)dt   (1   e
)Wt dNt;
12This approach requires an interior solution for optimal hours which is assumed throughout the analysis.
21which we use for our numerical solutions. Finally, the risk premium (49) is obtained from
RPt = ~ C(Wt)
(1 )   ~ H(Wt)
(1 ) e
 (1 ) (1   e
): (54)
As a result, the implicit risk premium depends on the optimal jumps in consumption and
hours immediately after a disaster. Accordingly, we obtain the jump terms and thus the risk
premium from (54) by evaluating the optimal policy functions at points in the state space.
3.2.5 Results
In what follows, we restrict our discussion to the empirically most relevant case where   1.
The key result is that eective risk aversion, except for the singular case  =  , is still a
function of nancial wealth. This in turn implies a time-varying risk premium since wealth
is changing stochastically over time. As shown in the appendix, elastic labor supply,   6= 0,
primarily has an eect on the optimal hours supplied, but does not substantially aect the
shape and properties of the risk premium (cf. Figures A.1 and A.2).
The knife-edge value  =   ensures that the individual's optimal choice of leisure is
constant (cf. Bodie et al., 1992). In this particular case, the expected proportional decline
of marginal utility with respect to consumption matches the expected rate of return apart
from a constant. Moreover, we obtain that the marginal propensity to save (to consume),
s(Wt) = s, the supplied hours, H(Wt) = H, and the risk premium are all constant measures
over time (consumption becomes a homogeneous function of degree ). For  <   the
individual prefers a higher saving rate, s(Wt) > s, and supplies more hours, H(Wt) > H.
Because both optimal policy functions for consumption and hours are concave, the eective
risk aversion of the value function is lower than for   = 0. The risk premium is convex in
nancial wealth and has the upper bound e (1   e) for wealth approaching zero. For
 >   the marginal propensity to save is smaller, s(Wt) < s, and the individual supplies less
hours, H(Wt) < H, which in fact raises the eective risk aversion. Since the saving rate is
decreasing in wealth, the risk premium is concave with lower bound e (1   e).
An empirically testable implication is the correlation between hours and consumption. In
the data, hours and consumption are positively correlated which in turn implies a negative
correlation between consumption and leisure (cf. Lettau and Uhlig, 2000). We may infer this
property directly from the policy functions. For  =   there is zero correlation, while for
 <   consumption and hours are concave functions of nancial wealth (which has the usual
interpretation of the capital stock per eective worker), and we obtain a positive correlation.
It is only for  >   that the optimal policy function for hours is convex. In turn this implies
a counterfactual negative correlation as long as the consumption function is concave. Thus,
the empirically most plausible case  <   implies strictly concave policy functions for both
22consumption and hours, as well as time-varying and asymmetric risk premia similar to the
benchmark case of constant labor supply   = 0.
Summarizing, the extension to endogenous labor supply is able to generate empirically
plausible correlations for consumption and leisure. Though our main results on the shape
and the time-varying property of the risk premium are not aected, the ability to buer
risk trough the labor-leisure choice makes it even more challenging to generate sizable risk
premia in production economies. One interesting extension could therefore examine the role
of dierent types of non-linearities such as capital adjustment cost and/or habit formation
which would aect eective risk aversion and thus the risk premium (cf. Jermann, 2010).
4 Conclusion
In this paper we study how non-linearities aect asset pricing implications in a production
economy. We derive closed-form solutions of the Lucas' fruit-tree model and compare the
implicit risk premium to those obtained from models which account for non-linearities in the
form of a neoclassical production function. For this purpose, we formulate our DSGE models
in continuous time which gives analytical benchmark solutions for numerical analysis. Our
key result is that these non-linearities can generate time-varying and asymmetric risk premia
over the business cycle. The economic intuition is that individual's eective risk aversion,
except for singular cases, is not constant in a neoclassical production economy. We show that
non-normalities in the form of rare disasters substantially increase the economic relevance
of these (empirical) key features.
From a methodological point of view, this paper shows that formulating the endowment
economy or non-trivial production models in continuous time gives analytical solutions for
reasonable parametric restrictions or functional forms. Analytical solutions are useful for
macro-nance models for at least two reasons. First, they are points of reference from which
numerical methods can be used to explore a broader class of models. Second, they shed light
on asset market implications without relying purely on numerical methods. This circumvents
problems induced by approximation schemes which could be detrimental when studying the
eects of uncertainty. Along these lines, we propose the continuous-time formulation of
DSGE models as a workable paradigm in macro-nance.
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27A Appendix
A.1 Lucas fruit-tree model in continuous-time
A.1.1 Deriving the budget constraint
Consider a portfolio strategy which holds nt units of the risky asset and n0(t) units of the
riskless asset with default risk, such that
Wt = n0(t)p0(t) + ptnt
denotes the portfolio value. Using It^ o's formula, it follows that
dWt = p0(t)dn0(t) + n0(t)p0(t)rdt + ptdnt + wtWtdt + wtWdBt
+(wt Jt + (1   wt )Dt)Wt dNt;
where wtWt  ntpt denotes the amount invested in the risky asset. Since investors use their
savings to accumulate assets, assuming no dividend payments, p0(t)dn0(t) +ptdnt =  Ctdt,
dWt = ((   r)wtWt + rWt   Ct)dt + wtWtdBt
+((Jt   Dt)wt  + Dt)Wt dNt:
Finally, we obtain the budget constraint (6) by dening
M  (   r)wt + r; M  wt; M(t)  (Dt   Jt)wt   Dt:
A.1.2 The short-cut approach
As a necessary condition for optimality the Bellman's principle gives at time s









Using It^ o's formula (see e.g. Sennewald, 2007),
dV (Ws) =
 







dt + MWsVWdBt + (V (Ws)   V (Ws ))dNt
=
 








+(V ((1   M(t ))Ws )   V (Ws ))dNt;
where 2
M is the instantaneous variance of the risky asset's return from the Brownian motion
increments. If we take the expectation of the integral form, and use the property of stochastic
28integrals, we may write using M  E(M(t)jDt = exp()   1) = 1   e   (e1   e)w and

0
M  E(M(t)jDt = 0) = (1   e2)w,
EsdV (Ws) =
 






+(V ((1   M)Ws)q + V ((1   
0
M)Ws)(1   q)   V (Ws))

dt:
Inserting into (55) gives the Bellman equation
V (Ws) = max
Cs







+(V ((1   M)Ws)q + V ((1   
0
M)Ws)(1   q)   V (Ws))
	
:
The rst-order condition (9) makes consumption a function of the state variable. Using
the maximized Bellman equation for all s = t 2 [0;1),







+(V ((1   M)Wt)q + V ((1   
0
M)Ws)(1   q)   V (Wt)):
Use the envelope theorem to compute the costate












M)(1   q)   VW(Wt)):
Collecting terms, we obtain












M)(1   q)): (56)
Using It^ o's formula, the costate obeys





t VWWWdt + MWtVWWdBt
+(VW((1   M(t ))Wt )   VW(Wt ))dNt
=
 
(   M + )VW   
2








+MWtVWWdBt + (VW((1   M(t ))Wt )   VW(Wt ))dNt;
where we inserted the costate from (56). As a nal step we insert the rst-order condition
and obtain the Euler equation (10).
29A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2.1
The idea of this proof is to show that using an educated guess of the value function, the
maximized Bellman equation and the rst-order condition (9) are both fullled. For constant






+ C2;  > 0; (C1;C2) 2 R+  R: (57)
From (8), we obtain the maximized Bellman equation using the functional equation for




W . We use the educated guess






where  VW = C0C1W
 
t and  VWW =  C0C1W
  1
t , to solve the resulting equation. Note
that optimal consumption is linear in wealth, C(Wt) = C
 1=






























1 q + (1   
0
M)
























1 q + (1   
0
M)















   (1   )M +    (1   M)1 






where the last equality used that in general equilibrium asset prices in (16) imply M = 
0
M.
This proofs that the guess (58) indeed is a solution, and by inserting the guess together with
the constant, we obtain the policy function for consumption.
30Table A.1: Calibrated model and the risk premium (endowment economy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Parameters
No Low High Low Low Low
disasters Baseline   q   
 (coef. of relative
risk aversion) 4 4 3 4 4 4 4
  (s.d. of growth rate,
no disasters) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
 (rate of time
preference) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
  (growth rate,
deterministic part) 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.020 0.025
 (disaster probability) 0 0.017 0.017 0.025 0.017 0.017 0.017
q (default probability
in disaster) 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.4
1   e  (size of disaster) 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
1   e (size of default) 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Variables
Default risk 0 0.021 0.012 0.03 0.016 0.021 0.021
Disaster risk 0 0.031 0.019 0.046 0.036 0.031 0.031
Residual risk 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Implicit risk premium 0.002 0.054 0.032 0.078 0.054 0.054 0.054
Expected market rate 0.128 0.06 0.067 0.028 0.06 0.04 0.05
Expected bill rate 0.126 0.031 0.051 -0.013 0.026 0.011 0.021
Market premium 0.002 0.029 0.016 0.041 0.033 0.029 0.029
Expected market rate,
conditional 0.128 0.066 0.074 0.038 0.066 0.046 0.056
Face bill rate 0.126 0.034 0.054 -0.009 0.028 0.014 0.024
Market premium, conditional 0.002 0.033 0.02 0.047 0.038 0.033 0.033
Sharpe ratio, conditional 0.08 1.641 0.996 2.366 1.901 1.641 1.641
Expected growth rate 0.025 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.016 0.011 0.016
Expected growth rate,
conditional 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.02 0.025
31Table A.2: Calibrated model and the risk premium (endowment economy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Parameters
No High High High Low Low
default Baseline    q 1   e  1   e
 (coef. of relative
risk aversion) 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
  (s.d. of growth rate,
no disasters) 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
 (rate of time
preference) 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
  (growth rate,
deterministic part) 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025
 (disaster probability) 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.2 0.017 0.017 0.017
q (default probability
in disaster) 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 1 0.4 0.4
1   e  (size of disaster) 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.034 0.4 0.2 0.4
1   e (size of default) 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.034 0.4 0.4 0.2
Variables
Default risk 0 0.021 0.021 0.003 0.052 0.007 0.01
Disaster risk 0.052 0.031 0.031 0.004 0 0.002 0.042
Residual risk 0.002 0.002 0.01 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Implicit risk premium 0.054 0.054 0.062 0.009 0.054 0.01 0.054
Expected market rate 0.06 0.06 0.047 0.102 0.06 0.108 0.06
Expected bill rate 0.013 0.031 0.01 0.099 0.058 0.106 0.022
Market premium 0.047 0.029 0.037 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.038
Expected market rate,
conditional 0.066 0.066 0.054 0.108 0.066 0.112 0.066
Face bill rate 0.013 0.034 0.013 0.102 0.065 0.108 0.023
Market premium, conditional 0.054 0.033 0.041 0.006 0.002 0.003 0.043
Sharpe ratio, conditional 2.681 1.641 0.824 0.292 0.08 0.162 2.161
Expected growth rate 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.019 0.016 0.021 0.016
Expected growth rate,
conditional 0.025 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025
32Table A.3: Calibrated model and the risk premium (production economy)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Parameters
No High Low Low High High
disasters Baseline     jj
 (coef. of relative
risk aversion) 4 4 6 4 4 4 4
 (output elasticity
of capital) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.33 0.75 0.75 0.75
 (capital depreciation,
deterministic part) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.1
 (rate of time
preference) 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
 (s.d. of stochastic
depreciation, no disasters) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  (s.d. of TFP growth) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
  (growth rate TFP,
deterministic part) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
 (disaster probability) 0 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.02 0.017
1   e (size of disaster) 0 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
Variables
Implied knife-edge value   0.200 0.230 0.435 0.035 0.130 0.236 0.251
Implicit risk premium
steady state, conditional 0 0.024 0.034 0.014 0.027 0.028 0.045
zero wealth (left limit) 0 0.032 0.068 0.013 0.032 0.037 0.068
Market rate, steady state (gross) 0.150 0.131 0.116 0.147 0.077 0.128 0.122
Bill rate, steady state (gross) 0.150 0.107 0.081 0.133 0.051 0.101 0.078
33A.2 A model of growth under uncertainty
A.2.1 The Bellman equation and the Euler equation
As a necessary condition for optimality the Bellman's principle gives at time s









Using It^ o's formula yields












+[V (Ws;As)   V (Ws ;As )]dNt
= ((rs   )Ws + w
L












dt + [V (e
Ws ;As )   V (Ws ;As )]dNt:
Using the property of stochastic integrals, we may write
V (Ws;As) = max
Cs

u(cs) + ((rs   )Ws + w
L











+VA As + [V (e
Ws;As)   V (Ws;As)]g
for any s 2 [0;1). Because it is a necessary condition for optimality, we obtain the rst-order
condition (29) which makes optimal consumption a function of the state variables.
For the evolution of the costate we use the maximized Bellman equation
V (Wt;At) = u(C(Wt;At)) + ((rt   )Wt + w
L













Wt;At)   V (Wt;At)]; (59)
where rt = r(Wt;At) and wL
t = w(Wt;At) follow from the rm's optimization problem, and
the envelope theorem (also for the factor rewards) to compute the costate,
VW =  AtVAW + ((rt   )Wt + w
L















Collecting terms we obtain
(   (rt   ) + )VW = VAW  At + ((rt   )Wt + w
L















Using It^ o's formula, the costate obeys












+((rt   )Wt + w
L
t   Ct)VWWdt + VWWWtdZt + [VW(Wt;At)   VW(Wt ;At )]dNt;
34where inserting yields
dVW = (   (rt   ) + )VWdt   VW(e
Wt;At)e
   
2VWWWtdt + VAWAt dBt
+VWWWtdZt + [VW(e
Wt ;At )   VW(Wt ;At )]dNt;
which describes the evolution of the costate variable. As a nal step, we insert the rst-order
condition (29) to obtain the Euler equation (30).
A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 3.1
The idea of this proof is to show that using an educated guess of the value function, the
maximized Bellman equation (59) and the rst-order condition (29) are both fullled. We












t , Ct = C
 1=
1 Wt:
Now use the maximized Bellman equation (59), the property of the Cobb-Douglas technology,
FK = AtK
 1
t L1  and FL = (1 )AtK
t L
 
t , together with the transformation Kt  LWt,


































where we dened g(At)  f(At) fA At   1
2fAA 2A2
t. When imposing the condition  = 



















































This proofs that the guess (60) indeed is a solution, and by inserting the guess together with
the constant, we obtain the optimal policy function for consumption.
35A.2.3 Proof of Proposition 3.5





















Now use the maximized Bellman equation (59), the property of the Cobb-Douglas technology,
FK = AtK
 1
t L1  and FL = (1 )AtK
t L , together with the transformation Kt  LWt,











+ ((rt   )Wt + w
L













Wt;At)   V (Wt;At)];
Inserting the guess and collecting terms gives
 +     1
2
 
(1 + ) 
2   (1   )
2











which has a solution for C
 1=
1 = (   1)= and
 = (e
(1 )   1)     + 1
2
 
(1 + ) 
2   (1   )
2
  (1   ):
This proofs that the guess (61) indeed is a solution, and by inserting the guess together with
the constant, we obtain the optimal policy function for consumption.
A.3 A model of growth under uncertainty with leisure
A.3.1 The Bellman equation and the Euler equation
As a necessary condition for optimality the Bellman's principle gives at time s









Using It^ o's formula yields
dV = VW(dWs   (e












+[V (Ws;As)   V (Ws ;As )]dNt
= ((rs   )Ws + Hsw
H












dt + [V (e
Ws ;As )   V (Ws ;As )]dNt:
36Using the property of stochastic integrals, we may write
V (Ws;As) = max
Cs;Hs















+ VA As + [V (e
Ws;As)   V (Ws;As)]
	
for any s 2 [0;1). Because it is a necessary condition for optimality, we obtain the rst-
order conditions (45) and (46) which make optimal consumption and hours functions of the
state variables, Ct = C(Wt;At) and Ht = H(Wt;At), respectively.
For the evolution of the costate we use the maximized Bellman equation
















Wt;At)   V (Wt;At)]; (62)
where rt = r(Wt;At) and wL
t = w(Wt;At) follow from the rm's optimization problem, and
the envelope theorem (also for the factor rewards) to compute the costate,
VW =  AtVAW + ((rt   )Wt + Htw
H
















Collecting terms we obtain


















Using It^ o's formula, the costate obeys













+((rt   )Wt + Htw
H
t   Ct)VWWdt + [VW(Wt;At)   VW(Wt ;At )]dNt;
where inserting yields
dVW = (   (rt   ) + )VWdt   VW(e
Wt;At)e
   
2VWWWtdt + VAWAt dBt
+VWWWtdZt + [VW(e
Wt ;At )   VW(Wt ;At )]dNt;
which describes the evolution of the costate variable. As a nal step, we insert the rst-order
condition (45) to obtain the Euler equation (48).
A.3.2 Proof of Proposition 3.5









37From the rst-order conditions (45) and (46), we obtain
C
 
t (1   Ht)







t (1   Ht)











Suppose that optimal hours are constant, Ht = H, then optimal consumption becomes
a constant fraction of income,
Ct = (1   s)AtW

t H
1 ; 1   s  (1   )
1   H
 H
;   6= 0:
Inserting everything into (62) and collecting terms gives
 






(1 + ) 




























Hence, for  =   and
C1 =  
(1   s)1 H(1 )(1 )(1   H)(1 ) 
(1   )H1    (1   )(1   s)H1 ;
the constant saving rate is indeed the optimal solution. The optimal hours can be obtained
from the rst-order condition for consumption
Ct(1   H)
  1 











   = C
 1=
1 :







 +(1 )  =  
(1   s)1 H(1 )(1 )(1   H)(1 ) 






(1   )H   (1   )(1   )(1   H)= 
:
Collecting terms yields
  =  
(1   )(1   H)
(1   )H   (1   )(1   )(1   H)= 
,   (1   )H = (1   )(1   H)
, H =
(1   )
(1   )    (1   )
which are admissible solutions if and only if 0 < H < 1, which holds for  > 1.
38A.3.3 Obtaining the reduced form
In order to keep notation simple, this section provides the full derivation for a deterministic
system ( = 0). The complete derivation for the stochastic system is available on request










YHH=YHuHuCC +  u
(   (rt   ))dt
 
uCCuH
YHH=YHuHuCC +  u
YHK
YH
((rt   )Wt + Htw
H
t   Ct)dt;
dWt = ((rt   )Wt + Htw
H
t   Ct)dt:
We can neglect the rst equation because in equilibrium Ct = C(H(Wt)). We nd that
dHt =
 (1   ) C
 2
t (1   Ht)2(1 )  1    C
 2
t (1   Ht)2(1 )  1
YHH=YH C
 2
t (1   Ht)2(1 )  1 +  u




t (1   Ht)2(1 )  1
YHH=YH C
 2
t (1   Ht)2(1 )  1 +  u
YHK
YH








t (1   Ht)
2(1 )  2 + ( 
2   
2 
2    )C
 2






2 +  
2   
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t (1   Ht)
2(1 )  2
=   (        )C
 2
t (1   Ht)
2(1 )  2:
Hence, inserting  u and collecting terms yields
dHt =
 1
YHH=YH + ((1   )    )(1   Ht) 1(   (rt   ))dt
 

YHH=YH + ((1   )    )(1   Ht) 1
YHK
YH
((rt   )Wt + Htw
H
t   Ct)dt:
Inserting remaining partial derivatives yields,
dHt =
  + rt   
 H
 1
t + ((1   )    )(1   Ht) 1dt +
 (rt      Ct=Wt)
 H
 1
t + ((1   )    )(1   Ht) 1dt
=
   rt +  + (rt      Ct=Wt)
H
 1
t + (   (1   ) )(1   Ht) 1dt:
To summarize, the reduced form description of the deterministic model can be written as
dHt =
 + (1   )   (1   )rt   Ct=Wt
H
 1
t + (   (1   ) )(1   Ht) 1 dt
dWt = ((rt   )Wt + Htw
H
t   Ct)dt;
where Ct = C(H(Wt);Wt).
39Figure A.1: Risk premia in a production economy














































Notes: These gures illustrate the optimal policy functions for consumption (left panel), for hours (middle panel) and the risk
premium (right panel) as functions of individual wealth for dierent levels of relative risk aversion for the case of  =   =   = 0,
for calibrations (;;;;;1   e; ) = (:05;:75;;:1;:017;:4;0) where  = :75 (dotted),  = 4 (dashed), and  = 6 (solid).














































Notes: These gures illustrate the optimal policy functions for consumption (left panel), for hours (middle panel) and the risk
premium (right panel) as functions of individual wealth for dierent levels of relative risk aversion for the case of  =   =   = 0,
for calibrations (;;;;;1   e; ) = (:05;:75;;:1;:017;:4;1) where  = :75 (dotted),  = 4 (dashed), and  = 6 (solid).
40Figure A.2: Risk premia in a production economy












































Notes: These gures illustrate the optimal policy functions for consumption (left panel), for hours (middle panel) and the risk
premium (right panel) as functions of individual wealth for dierent levels of relative risk aversion for the case of  =   =   = 0,
for calibrations (;;;;;1   e; ) = (:03;:75;;:25;:017;:4;0) where  = :75 (dotted),  = 4 (dashed), and  = 6 (solid).












































Notes: These gures illustrate the optimal policy functions for consumption (left panel), for hours (middle panel) and the risk
premium (right panel) as functions of individual wealth for dierent levels of relative risk aversion for the case of  =   =   = 0,
for calibrations (;;;;;1   e; ) = (:03;:75;;:25;:017;:4;1) where  = :75 (dotted),  = 4 (dashed), and  = 6 (solid).
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